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Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability




This paper examines the relationship of war to power concentration and alliance configuration among the
major powers. It does so by developing a theoretical argument from the literature on bipolarity and
multipolarity. The paper suggests that bipolarity has two components &mdash; power distribution and alliance
clustering. The two, it is argued, have ’opposite’ effects on warfare in the major power system: power
bipolarity minimizes the magnitude of those wars that do break out, while alliance bipolarity increases
the likelihood that a war will occur. Correlational evidence, drawn from the Correlates of War data set,
is supportive of both hypotheses for the twentieth century. The power polarity hypothesis is also confirmed
for the nineteenth century, but the alliance polarity hypothesis seems disconfirmed for that century,
perhaps because of the effects of hostility on the balance of power alliance structures of that era. The con-
ceptual framework and findings of the present paper allow one the reexamine the classic debate on the
relative probabilities of war in bipolar and multipolar systems. The insights of Deutsch and Singer on
the one hand and Waltz on the other appear to be more consistent with each other than heretofore
recognized. Key elements of both the Waltz and the Deutsch and Singer arguments are supported by the
findings. On the other hand, more recent, empirical studies by Bueno de Mesquita and others are critiqued
on the basis of the present paper’s theoretical perspective and empirical findings.
1. Polarization and war
One of the great debates in the study of inter-
national conflict involves the relation between
the polarization of an international system and
the outbreak of war.’ In its classic and simplest
form, as articulated by Waltz (1964, 1967) and
by Deutsch & Singer (1964), this debate centers
on whether ’bipolarity’ or ’multipolarity’ is
more likely to lead to war. The present paper
proposes to integrate partially the two sides in
this debate through a new analytic framework.
This new framework is necessary for three rea-
sons. First, the distinction between bipolarity
and multipolarity, like the distinction between
liberal and conservative, is multidimensional in
character; just as there are different dimen-
sions of liberalism, so there are different di-
mensions of bipolarity. While this point has
been made by a number of scholars, including
Rapkin et al. (1979) and Snyder & Diesing
(1977), the implications for the classic liter-
ature and for empirical research on war and
peace have not been adequately examined; the
present paper will investigate both such impli-
cations. Second, while it is not fully realized by
scholars, sometimes the major power system is
neither bipolar nor multipolar, but rather pure-
ly multipolar on one dimension and purely bi-
polar on another; the miniscule inter-dimen-
sion correlations documented below should
help drive this point home and raise serious
questions about much of the empirical work
that has been done to test the Waltz and
Deutsch-Singer hypotheses. Third, the theore-
tical and empirical work in the present paper
increases the support for the contention that
(a), contrary to the conventional wisdom, a
multipolar power distribution breeds large sca-
le wars, while (b) multipolarity on other di-
mensions - the ’spatial’ or ’horizontal’ di-
mensions of friendship and hostility patterns
- may lead to peace. In the paper, correlation
and regression analysis of data from the Corre-
lates of War Project is used to explore this rela-
tionship of polarization to warfare over the pe-
riod from 1815 to 1965. The data analysis,
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while ambiguous at points, suggests that spa-
tial, or alignment, bipolarity increases the
threat of war, while power bipolarity decreases
that threat.
2. The debate on polarity
’Bipolarity’ usually refers to a situation in
which the international system or one of its
subsystems is dominated by two superpowers,
each with a supporting bloc of relatively weak
allies. ’Multipolarity’ usually refers to an op-
posite condition in which more than two great
powers play dominant roles in the international
system. Deutsch and Singer argue that for two
reasons multipolarity is more stable - i.e.,
more likely to remain in a steady, peaceful sta-
te - than bipolarity. First, in a bipolar world,
all conflicts involve the nations of one side
against those of the other, so that each side co-
mes to regard the other as the enemy. In a mul-
tipolar world, interaction patterns increase in
complexity and variety. An enemy on one issue
becomes an ally on another. Cross-cutting
cleavages and cross-pressures decrease the like-
lihood that implacable hostilities will develop
(Deutsch & Singer, op.cit., p. 394). Second, as
the number of poles increases, each actor is
forced to divide his attention among more and
more poles. This divided attention makes esca-
lating arms races of the type Richardson
describes less likely (ibid., p. 399).
Waltz counters with the thesis that bipolarity
is more stable than multipolarity. Selecting
the Cold War between the United States and
the Soviet Union as a bipolar system, he
argues that the second-strike capabilities and
militarily dominant position of the two super-
powers (1) deterred any possible attack the
one might launch on the other, and (2) allowed
each to control extremists in their own camps
(as, for example, the U.S. did against Britain
and France when they seized the Suez Canal in
1956). The result of these two restraints was
a relatively peaceful Cold War era despite
high tensions. Waltz also addresses the matter
of divided attention, but argues that as the
number of poles increase, divided attention
breeds miscalculation and thereby increases
the probability of war.
Deutsch, Singer and Waltz carried on their
debate about polarity in the aftermath of
Kaplan’s System and Process in International
Politics (1957), which popularized the discus-
sion of power systems in terms of the ideal
types of multipolarity (the classic balance of
power) and loose or tight bipolarity. It is a
thesis of this paper that the balance of power
and alliance polarization should not be treated
in terms of such ideal types, but should rather
be treated in terms of the variables used to
compute the product-moment about the center
of a space (Wallace 1973). In such an analysis,
the two key variables are the weight, or power
of a country, and the degree of hostility or
friendship which obtains in its relations with
other nation-states in the system.
3. Measuring weights and hostility
In applying this model to the real world, the
weight of each state and the degree of its
hostility or friendship to other states must be
measured. Measuring the weight, or power,
of a country has been approached in several
ways. One method has been to look for con-
crete power-attributes, or capabilities, which
can be used as measures of countries’ power
(Sabrosky 1975, Knorr 1955). This approach
has been criticized on grounds that (1) ’power’
should be reserved for the ability of country
A to modify the behavior of country B; (2)
attributes, such as GNP and military spending,
only provide certain tools or capabilities that
can be converted into power, and do not
represent power itself; (3) power, unlike these
attributes, is variable across a limited domain
and scope (Dahl 1970, p. 18); (4) the capa-
bilities or power of a set of countries may
not be additive when they form an alliance;
(5) power is an extremely ambiguous, and
perhaps superfluous, concept in social science
analysis (Riker 1962, 1969).
A second approach to the measurement of
power is to look for measures of perceived
national power. This approach assumes that
’power’, in the phrase ’the balance of power’,
means the perceived power of a country in
the minds of statesmen and other attentive
observers of the international system. Per-
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ceived power is thus a key factor in the minds
of statesmen as they adjust their national
policies and alliance patterns. This formula-
tion assumes that statesmen and others make
judgments about the power of states on a
ratio scale. These judgments are conceivably
recoverable through some instrument such as
a questionnaire.
A third approach in the literature on
national power is to look for objective
attributes that predict perceived power. Alcock
& Newcombe (1970), studying the perceptions
of students and citizens in Canada and Latin
America, concluded that GNP and military
expenditures are both excellent predictors of
perceived national power, with military ex-
penditures being a better predictor if warring
nations are included in the ratings. Their
approach integrates the first two by demon-
strating that attributes, such as GNP, are
highly correlated with perceived power.
The second key variable, the degree of
hostility between pairs of nations, can be
measured by questionnaire administration
(Klingberg 1941), analysis of alliance data
(Wallace, op.cit.), analysis of voting in or
membership in international organizations,
analysis of trade data (Goldman 1974, p.
134ff., Wall 1972), or content analysis. Such
data can then be scaled through the use of
multidimensional scaling routines. Efforts
based on perceptual data (Klingberg, op.cit.)
and on aggregate data (Wallace, op.cit.) have
been productive in this way. For ease of
presentation, these analyses can often be
presented visually in graphs in which friendly
nations cluster close together and hostile
nations are distant from one another. The
present paper analyzes pairs of nations in
terms of the degree of hostile or friendly
relations between their governments. Some-
times hostile pairs are labelled ’distant’ from
each other, and the reader should realize that
this is a spatial metaphor for hostility between
the governments, not a description of geo-
graphic distance.
4. Propositions about polarization
A model involving weight and locations
suggests the following definitions and pro-
positions about polarity.
Definition 1. A system is power bipolar
when capabilities are so distributed that
two dominant hostile powers are more
powerful than other actors to a degree
that gives the dominant powers autonomy
in self-defense.
The second-strike capabilities of the U.S.
and the Soviet Union in the 1960s would
illustrate this concept.
Definition 2. A system is power multipolar
when capabilities are more evenly distri-
buted than in the power bipolar condition,
and when hostility is still high.
Definition 3. A system is cluster bipolar
when most or all of the states in the system
are tightly packed into two political
clusters, with high mutual hostility, and
very few or no states play intermediate
or cross-cutting roles. In the perfect form
of tight cluster bipolarity, the members
are all mutually closer to each other than
any of them are to any member of the
other cluster.
Definition 4. A system is cluster multipolar
when the states are more evenly distributed
throughout the space, with many oppor-
tunities for intermediaries and many cross-
cutting loyalties to moderate hostility.
Power bipolarity and power multipolarity
are mutually exclusive categories. So are
cluster bipolarity and cluster multipolarity.
It is essential to realize, however, that a
system that is power bipolar can be either
cluster bipolar or cluster multipolar, and that
a power multipolar system can likewise be
either cluster multipolar or cluster bipolar.2 2
Thus, in Table I, starting clockwise from
the upper left corner, the reader can examine
how Europe has proceeded through four
successive types of international system
since 1919. In the period after World War I
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Table 1. Two Dimensions of Polarization.
and before the rise of Hitler, the European
state system, in which the United States was
by now an actor, was power multipolar and
cluster multipolar.
In World War II, the European system was
cluster bipolar -. with virtually all the key
actors locked in a deadly conflict between
fascist and anti-fascist coalitions - but power
multipolar - with Britain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union depending on each other
for support against the Axis onslaught. In
the Cold War of the early 1950s, Europe was
power bipolar and cluster bipolar. By the
early 1970s, Europe remained power bipolar,
but had moved towards cluster multipolarity,
to some extent with the partial dissolution
of the tightly clustered Cold War alliance
patterns, but much more as indicated by
shifting trade and economic indicators of
polarization.3
A fifth definition is useful for the devel-
opment of the argument:
Definition 5. A system is unipolar if none
of the states in the system are hostile
enough to each other to induce mutual fear
and aggressive designs.
Rapkin, Thompson, and Christopherson have
drawn similar distinctions. Differences in
terminology should not obscure these simi-
larities. What they call ’bipolarity’ is here
called ’power bipolarity’. What they call
’bipolarization’ is here called ’cluster bipo-
larity’. The terminology used here is simply
useful for drawing out the implications of
the Deutsch-Singer-Waltz debate. While
Rapkin, Thompson, and Christopherson have
expressed the key distinction and traced its
origins in empirical studies by a host of
authors, they did not trace its implications
back to the Deutsch-Singer-Waltz debate or
use insights gleaned from such a literature
review to test the Deutsch-Singer-Waltz
hypotheses about system structure and war;
this effort will be undertaken in the present
paper. Hence, the following set of propositions
provides the theoretical rationale for em-
phasizing the distinction between power and
spatial polarity.
Proposition 1. The greater the number of
pairs of states in the system with a degree
of hostility above some critical level, the
greater the likelihood of war.
This proposition states an obvious, but
nonetheless important, relationship: hostility
leads to mutual fear and a high probability
of warfare. Two countries close together
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(again, close in the cluster analysis of friend-
ship, not necessarily in geographic proximity)
have by definition compatible interests, and
tend to identify with each other to the point
where war between them is unthinkable. Ex-
amples in the contemporary world would be
Denmark and Sweden, or Canada and the
United States (Deutsch et al., op.cit.). It is
when actors are extremely distant from each
other along some dimension - as in the case
of Israel and the P.L.O. - that the potential
for violence is high.
Proposition one correctly asserts that
hostility increases the likelihood of war. To
fully understand proposition one, we must
place it in the context of two other proposi-
tions. How the system is polarized affects
the likelihood of the war becoming massive
(examined in proposition two) and even the
strength of the relationship between hostility
and war (examined in proposition three).
Proposition 2. In a system that is power
bipolar, warfare if it occurs is likely to be
minimal and not system-engulfing, whereas
in a system that is power multipolar, war-
fare will be of higher magnitude if it
occurs.
When the strongest powers in the system are
fairly independent of support from their
allies, as they are under power bipolarity,
they can confidently manage a crisis in which
one of their allies has taken a position of
extreme hostility towards the enemy coalition.
Since such a self-sufficient big power does
not really need the ally in a vital sense, the
ally can be left isolated until it sees the
dangers of its extreme position and com-
promises that position. When the big powers
are not self-sufficient, any member of their
coalition which takes an extreme position
on an issue has a chance of dragging the big
power, and thence the whole alliance, into a
conflagration. The classic instance of such
power multipolar behavior is World War I.
In 1914, the Central Powers (Germany and
Austria-Hungary) were in an inferior position
in terms of capabilities (Sabrosky, op.cit.).
Germany felt isolated and surrounded by
enemies on two fronts. When Germany’s sole
European ally, Austria-Hungary, became
involved in a dispute with Serbia over the
assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdi-
nand, Germany gave Austria-Hungary a
’blank check’. Confident of German backing,
Austria-Hungary delivered a set of unreason-
able demands to Serbia, refused to accept
the Serbian note capitulating to the demands,
and prepared to invade Serbia. This induced
Russian mobilization, which precipitated
German activation of the Schlieffen plan,
which in turn plunged most of Europe into
a massive war.
A second example of power multipolarity
is the outbreak of the Great Peloponnesian
War (432-404 B.C.) between Athens and
Sparta. In the Greek system, both Athens
and Sparta felt threatened by each other, and
relied on elaborate coalitions for security.
Corcyra, a friend of Athens, became involved
in a dispute with Corinth, an ally of Sparta.
Keeping the Corcyrean navy from falling
into Corinthian hands was as critical to
Athenian military defense as Corinth’s wealth
was to any Spartan war effort. Athens could
not tolerate a Corcyrean defeat, nor could
Sparta tolerate a Corinthian defeat. Despite
the attempts of statesmen in Sparta and Athens
to arbitrate the dispute, Athens was forced
to defend Corcyra, and Corinth was able to
convince Sparta and her allies to go to war
against Athens (Kagan 1969).
Power bipolarity has characterized the era
of thermonuclear confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union. As
Waltz noted in the articles cited above, these
power relationships have forced the super-
powers to treat each other with great care,
to manage conflicts so as to prevent their
escalation, and have allowed the superpowers
to restrain the behavior of their allies. Of
course, the danger of severe warfare remains
if a conflict starts between the superpowers
and escalates into a nuclear war. But so far
the empirical results have been an era in which
Soviet and American troops have avoided
combat with each other and no system-wide
wars have broken out.
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Proposition 3. In a system that is cluster
bipolar, the amount of warfare per year is
likely to be large, whereas in a cluster
multipolar system, warfare is likely to be
of lower magnitude per unit of time.
This third proposition follows from the fact
that two important conflict-reducing agents
- namely, intermediary relationships and
cross-cutting cleavages - exist in a multi-
polar setting but are eliminated in a cluster
bipolar one. Intermediary relationships involve
the existence of a group of actors between
the two enemy camps on a single dimension
of conflict. The intermediaries, or actors in
the middle, have a number of peacekeeping
roles to perform. First, they play face saving
roles. These include (1) good offices, or the
offer of a neutral meeting ground (for exA
ample, the French government made such an
offer in 1968 to the U.S. and North Vietnam;
both sides were able to accept Paris as a
neutral meeting ground); (2) mediation, in
which neutral parties propose peace solutions
that would be unacceptable if they came from
the enemy camp (for example, Kissinger’s
Middle East shuttle diplomacy); and (3)
arbitration, in which neutral parties have
decisive powers in resolving the dispute (and
which is therefore rarely employed). In addi-
tion, the intermediaries, by simply playing
their role as moderates who do not have
extremely hostile relations with anyone, can
set the tone of political argument in the
entire system. The more numerous the inter-
mediaries, the more moderate will be this
overall tone. A similar moderating effect has
been observed in class conflict within nations:
in class politics in industrial societies, the
emerging new middle class has played such
a moderating role (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 51).
The peacekeeping roles of intermediaries
are determined by their spatial location
between enemy camps. Because the inter-
mediaries are not extremely distant from
either side, they have moderately good
relations with both sides. This insures that
the intermediaries will have relatively tranquil
relations with virtually all members of the
system, in contrast to the nations on the
extremes who necessarily view each other
across a distance twice as great. This tran-
quility provides a basis from which the inter-
mediaries can provide good offices and act
as mediators and arbitrators of disputes.
The above model assumes that intermediary
relationships occur along a single dimension
of conflict. When conflicts are more than
one-dimensional, a second conflict-reducing
agent may be introduced in multipolar settings,
namely, cross-cutting cleavages (Rae & Taylor
1970, pp. 85-92). Whereas the impact of inter-
mediary relations stems from the relatively
low distance (i.e., dissimilarity) between the
intermediaries and the extremists, the impact
of cross-cutting cleavages depends not on
distance but on the hostility-reducing impact
of cross-cutting alliance bonds. In the words
of an ancient saying, ’the enemy of my enemy
is my friend’. Thus, if Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, which fought each other in Yemen in
the 1960s, shared a common hostility towards
Israel, the common hostility would act as a
bond holding them closer together than they
would otherwise be. If Jordan, Israel, and
Saudi Arabia face a common threat from
Arab extremists, they are distracted from
their hostility for each other and forced to
concentrate on their common threat. If Saudi
Arabia and the U.S., which differ over Israel,
sense a common interest in blocking radical
socialism in the Arab world, this will lead
them to realize that differences over Israel
need not constitute an insurmountable barrier
to friendship. A multitude of such cross-
cutting loyalties, in which a nation’s opponent
on one issue becomes its ally on another,
make a nation aware that it may have shared
interests with all actors - including actors
with which it would have been purely and
dimetrically opposed in a one-dimensional
conflict.
As some of the examples may suggest,
however, cross-cutting cleavages are not an
unmixed blessing. A party that feels itself
threatened along one dimension of conflict
has an incentive to exacerbate tensions along
another, in a way that can split the opposing
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coalition. Such strategies increase hostility
between members of the system and increase
the risk of violence. This is a rule that applies
to all levels of conflict. In the example above,
for instance, the Soviet Union, trying to
penetrate the Arab world in the face of Arab
distaste for Soviet style communism, has
found favor with the militant Arabs by arming
them for war against Israel. Similarly, Saudi
Arabia’s monarchy can reduce the threat it
faces from radical Arabs by taking the fore-
front in financing the struggle against Israel.
A similar phenomenon occurs in American
domestic politics. Since the New Deal, the
Democrats have been the majority party.
Furthermore, on economic issues the Demo-
crats have enjoyed the support of the majority
of the American public. Aspiring Republican
politicians have therefore been tempted to
exacerbate symbolic cross-cutting issues such
as the Red-scares and law-and-order in order
to win some of the Democratic voters over
to the Republican camp. These tactics have
sometimes brought success at the polls, but
have embittered the political climate within
the United States. Thus, cross-cutting cleav-
ages can act to reduce hostility and distance,
but they can also be exploited with the opposite
effect.
Intermediary functions are the consequence
of the relatively short distances from the
intermediaries to the wings. Cross-cutting
functions, rather than the consequence of
distances, are a cause acting over time to
reduce the distance that would otherwise
exist between hostile pairs in a one-dimen-
sional conflict, but sometimes inducing an
increase in distance and hostility.
5. The ctassic debate revisited
In their debate on polarity, Deutsch and Singer
and Waltz are divided by two differences.
The first is a genuine disagreement about the
effect of multiple sources of stimuli. Waltz
argues that multiple stimuli are confusing and
dangerous, and that therefore a simple, bipolar
world is safer. Deutsch and Singer argue that
these multiple stimuli, by diluting attention,
lessen the likelihood of a vicious cycle of
increased tension and reciprocal arms build-
ups. The ability to completely focus attention
on one enemy pole would occur, in the lan-
guage of this paper, if power were absolutely
bipolar or if clustering were absolutely bipolar.
In either case, the only important opponents
would be located at one point, and attention
could focus on that point. To the degree that
the system becomes multipolar in both senses,
attention can no longer be focused on just
one enemy, and attention becomes diluted.
With theoretical predictions leading in op-
posite directions, it becomes an empirical
question whether multiple stimuli will either
produce a more peaceful system or a more
violent one.
The second disagreement is partly semantic.
Waltz argues that superpower dominance
makes a bipolar world stable, while Deutsch
and Singer argue that cross-cutting cleavages
and mediators make a multipolar world stable.
Waltz’s argument that power bipolarity is
more stable than power multipolarity (pro-
position 2 above) is not fundamentally in
conflict with Deutsch and Singer’s contention
that cluster multipolarity is more stable than
cluster bipolarity (proposition 3 above). Both
may simultaneously be correct.
6. Empirical evidence, 1815-1965
These two propositions can be tested, in an
exploratory way, with existing data. The
Correlates of War Project has produced data
over a long enough time series to allow
variation in systemic polarization and to
observe the impact of such variation on
warfare (Singer & Small 1968 and 1972, Singer,
Bremer & Stuckey 1972). The series so far
gathered do not always allow the ideal
operationalization of concepts; as a result,
there is the danger that hypotheses may be
accepted or rejected prematurely, on the basis
of inappropriate specification or operation-
alization. The data analysis which follows
should therefore be regarded as preliminary,
and not as a definitive test of the hypotheses
from the theory.
To insure as much of an independent test
of the theory as possible, no data were
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analyzed until after the theory had been con-
structed, circulated among colleagues, and put
in final form. In this way, the hypotheses
are derived from the historical examples and
reasoning of the first part of this paper, and
not from prior exploration of the data set.
6.1 Measurement
The test of hypotheses in the paper is based
on analysis of the system of interactions
among the major powers.4 As defined by
Singer & Small (1972), this major power
system varied in number from four to eight
members during the period from 1815 to 1965.
This is an appropriate group of states to
analyze for two reasons. First, a focus on the
major powers insures that one will examine
only states that do interact significantly with
each other; it is a focus on states ’which -
almost by definition - are highly inter-
dependent one with the other’, and hence are
guaranteed to make up a true ’system’ (Singer
et al. 1972, p. 22). Second, the major powers
were the nations with the capabilities and
predilections to engage in the rivalries as-
sociated with the balance of power and the
balance of terror. It is among such a group
of states, competing with and observing each
other, that one would expect hypotheses about
polarity to be confirmed. In 1816, at the dawn
of the period to be studied, these major
powers were Austria-Hungary, England,
France, Prussia, and Russia. The group grew
to include at various times Italy, Japan, the
United States, and China. Some members
dropped out, so that by 1965 the major powers
were again five in number.
In the analysis below, measurements will
be made on the major powers at five year
intervals, from 1815 to 1965. To avoid the
distorting effects of the world wars, and to
maintain consistency with earlier research,
these intervals of measurement are thrice
modified, with readings taken in 1913 rather
than 1915, in 1938 rather than 1940, and in
1946 rather than 1945.
The main index of warfare is the magnitude
of war, measured in nation-months of inter-
state war, as reported in Singer & Small (1972)
and Singer, Bremer & Stuckey (1972, p. 29).
Also measured was the frequency of inter-
state wars fought by major powers. These
war indices all cover a five-year period
following the moment at which system
polarization is measured; for example, if
polarization is measured in January 1820,
warfare is measured from January 1820
through December 1824.
Two measures of power concentration were
employed in the present study. One, reported
by Singer, Bremer & Stuckey (ibid.), measures
the inequality of the capabilities of the major
powers. This index is based on the standard
deviation of the capabilities of the major
powers; this number approaches zero when the
major powers are roughly equal in capabilities.
The second index, derived from the Singer-
Bremer-Stuckey data set, is a computation
of the percentage of major power capabilities
held by the two greatest powers.5 These two
indices are highly correlated with each other
(r = .90 for 1815-1965, r = .75 for the
nineteenth century, and r = .93 for the
twentieth century), and tend to produce very
similar results in hypothesis testing. By either
measure, power concentration was lowest
around the turn of the century and just before
World War II (see Table II).
Measuring the clustering of the system is more
difficult than measuring warfare or power
concentration. Perhaps the ideal data would
be scaling of hostility and friendship levels
gleaned from content analysis of diplomatic
documents. Such data are not directly avail-
able for the time span being examined. The
best available data are the data on alliance. 6
While alliance data measure one aspect of
cooperation between pairs of states, they
are not without their problems. One difficulty
is that alliances may be an intervening
variable between more basic displays of
hostility/friendship and the outbreak of war.
This difficulty makes it dangerous to attribute
causal significance to the correlations ex-
amined below. A second problem is that the
major power alliance data are not rich enough
in information to be subjected to multi-
dimensional scaling analysis. The cluster
69
Table II. Two Measures of Power Polarization.
a. CON is the concentration index of major power capabilities reported in Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, ’Capability
Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War,’ p. 22.
b. TWOCON is the percentage of major power capabilities held by the two largest powers.
analysis that can be performed does not
allow separate measurement of the degree of
intermediation and the degree of cross-cutting
in the system.
On the basis of the alliance data, a polariza-
tion index was constructed. To do this, a ’bloc’
was defined as a set of nations each of which
had a defense pact with each of the others;
for example, in 1955, France, the United
States, and the United Kingdom formed a
bloc. The number of ’poles’ in the system
is equal to the number of blocs plus the
number of non-bloc major powers. Cluster
bipolarity would exist if there were only two
poles. The maximum number of potential
poles in any year is of course identical to
a. A value of 1.0 represents maximum alliance multipolarity. Low values represent clustering of the system into blocs,
thereby tending toward alliance bipolarity.
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the number of major powers. The formation
of blocs, by reducing the number of poles,
cuts down on the potential for cross-cutting
cleavages and intermediary roles. The ratio of
actual poles to potential poles was used as
a measure of alliance polarization. The ratio
would reach 1.0 under maximum cluster
multipolarity, when there are no blocs; it
would approach 0.0 under cluster bipolarity
(or, as in the unique case of the Holy Alliance
of 1820, unipolarity). This index is presented
in Table III.
The main periods of bipolarity, when the
index is at its lowest values, were just before
World War I and during the Cold War.
6.2 Correlations and hypothesis testing
With the indices constructed, it was possible
to test several of the theoretical claims from
the first section of the paper. One of the
important findings of the data analysis is
that power polarity and cluster polarization
are in fact separate dimensions. Indeed, using
the measures developed for this study, the two
concepts are almost totally uncorrelated with
each other. Over the period 1815-1965, the
alliance polarization index correlates 0.01
with the measure of bipolar power concentra-
tion (TWOCON) and 0.12 with the Singer-
Bremer-Stuckey measure of power concentra-
tion (CON). In the nineteenth century, the
alliance polarization measure correlates -0.28
with TWOCON and 0.13 with CON. In the
twentieth century, these correlations are 0.10
and 0.16, respectively. None of these correla-
tions are statistically significant at the .05
level.’ 7
This complete lack of association between
measures of power concentration and alliance
polarization has implications both for the
polarization literature already discussed and
for the theoretical work of Snyder & Diesing
(op.cit. pp. 419-470). Of course, as noted
at the outset, if the two aspects of ’bipolarity’
are not even statistically associated with each
other, then the early literature that classified
all international systems as either ’bipolar’
or ’multipolar’ needs to be refined. Whereas
the early literature on polarity did tend to
collapse power bipolarity and alliance bipo-
larity into a single concept, Snyder and Diesing
are careful to distinguish ’system structure’
(the number of major powers and the distribu-
tion of capabilities) from the alliance patterns
in the system. However, Snyder and Diesing
do see a causal connection between the two
concepts; they argue that a bipolar power
concentration tends to produce alignments in
which the lesser powers cluster around the
two largest powers.8 The findings of this
paper put a greater emphasis on the distinction
between power concentration and alliance
configuration than do Snyder and Diesing,
who, after all, argue that the power polarity
variable has a causal impact on the alliance
patterns variable, while the two concepts as
measured in this paper are statistically
independent. Snyder and Diesing have based
their argument on references to the post-World
War II environment. Rapkin, Thompson, and
Christopherson do find a positive correlation
between bipolarity and bipolarization in the
Cold War period, but one should hestitate to
generalize those results to earlier eras, given
the findings of the present paper.
One possible reconciliation of the findings
with Snyder and Diesing would be to argue
that a bipolar power concentration does
produce a bipolar alliance configuration, but
only when the power concentration surpasses
a very high threshold, as it did in the late
1940s and early 1950s. A second possibility
is that ideological fervor, having been a major
cause of alliance formation after World War
II, was covarying with power concentration
and hence causing a portion of the correla-
tion reported by Rapkin, Thompson, and
Christopherson.9 Certainly, the era of John
Foster Dulles was a time when the U.S. formed
many alliances, such as CENTO, which were
appropriate to the operational code and
ideology of foreign policy officials, but
which may have done little to enhance the
interests of the United States. Third, it is
possible (indeed, likely) that future studies,
based on improved measures of bipolar power
concentration and bipolar alliance configura-
tion, will yield revised findings of the relation-
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Table IV. Power Polarization and the Magnitude of Major Power Inter-State War, 1815-1965.
ship between the two concepts. 10 At the present
time, when virtually no one reports validity
coefficients for new measures of polarization,
it is difficult to ascertain in what ways the
alliance indicator used in the present paper
would correlate with some factors from earlier
efforts to measure the same thing.&dquo; So the
debate about the above findings is by no means
settled, and should continue.
For the sake of hypothesis testing in the
remainder of this paper, the important fact
is that the independent variables (power
concentration and alliance configuration) in
the following tests are indeed statistically
independent of each other.
The first hypothesis, relating the amount
of warfare in the system to the amount of
hostility in the system, cannot be tested with
the data presently available. While such a test
would in all likelihood be a demonstration
of the obvious, it would be useful as a way
of controlling for effects that may disturb
the testing of hypothesis three, as will become
clear below.
The second hypothesis suggests that power
bipolarity should minimize the size of any wars
that might break out. The data are somewhat
supportive of this hypothesis. If we classify
relatively bipolar systems as ones in which
the two largest powers have over fifty percent
of great power capabilities, we find that the
major power system was power multipolar
thirty-four percent of the time, and power
bipolar in the other years. The power multi-
polar years were, if anything, slightly less war
prone. Only twenty-seven percent of the major
power inter-state wars broke out in those years,
and this is slightly, though insignificantly,
below the thirty-four percent that would have
occurred by chance. The second hypothesis
contends, however, that any wars that did
break out under power multipolarity would be
massive conflagrations. Table IV confirms this
hypothesis. Three-quarters of the wars under
power multipolarity were of high magnitude.
These included World Wars I and II. In con-
trast, three-quarters of the wars under power
bipolarity were of low magnitude. While the
size of this correlation does shrink somewhat
if different cutoffs are chosen for the two
dichotomies, the correlation does remain
supportive of the arguments in the theoretical
section of this paper. This is important
because it is the opposite of what some
scholars would have expected. Some scholars
have argued that in a multipolar world,
adjustments to the system occur through
frequent but low level warfare, whereas in
a bipolar world, wars are less frequent but
bigger. One of the most explicit statements of
this position is made by Michael Haas (1970,
p. 121): ’bipolarity brings fewer but longer
wars.’ Rosecrance (1969, p. 329) offers a
more qualified assertion of the same position:
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Table V. Cross-Lagged Correlations between War (Magnitude of Major Power Inter-state war Underway) and Cluster
Multipolaritya.
a. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients with significance levels for non-directional hypothesis. Italicized
figures show statistical significance at better than the .05 level for a directional hypothesis.
’It seems highly probable that a multipolar
world order will increase the number of
conflicts, though it may possibly reduce their
significance.’ Such contentions seem to be the
opposite of the findings of the present paper
that wars are more frequent but of lesser
magnitude under power bipolarity. While
Haas offers some statistical support for his
position, his findings may be based upon im-
pressionistic coding schemes that categorized,
for example, all historical systems, in a
dichotomous fashion, as ’bipolar’ or ’multi-
polar’, without clarifying whether the judg-
ments were based on power concentration or
alliance configuration. In short, the repro-
ducible evidence seems to support proposi-
tion two.
The third hypothesis, relating the amount
of war to the cluster polarization of the
system, is more difficult to test with existing
data. Because war, hostility, and even anti-
cipated war have a reciprocal causal impact
on alliance patterns, it is difficult to measure
the causal impact of alliance bipolarity on
war. Given these reciprocal causal linkages,
it would be best in testing the model to have
measures of variables that cause alliance
patterns but not war, and other variables
that cause war but not alliance patterns.
Without such measures, the best evidence
available is the cross-lagged correlations
between war and alliance polarization (see
Table V). The cross-lagged correlations cannot
be used for causal conclusions. The auto-
correlations for alliance polarization are
0.44 in the nineteenth century, 0.59 in the
twentieth century, and 0.52 for the entire
period 1815 to 1965; for war magnitude, the
autocorrelations are 0.72 in the nineteenth
century, -0.32 in the twentieth century, and
-0.1~ for the entire period. With such non-
zero autocorrelations, the cross-lagged cor-
relations do not have clear causal inter-
pretations, but can be used to suggest pos-
sibilities. To reduce the contaminating effect
of the autocorrelations, the first differences
were computed for both variables.
In Table V, war is always positively cor-
related with subsequent alliance multipolarity:
in both centuries, war seems to lead to a
dispersion of alliance blocs. In the twentieth
century, this cluster multipolarity is followed
by peace (see the fourth column of Table V),
as the third hypothesis contends. In the nine-
teenth century, however, the opposite of the
hypothesis seems to hold true, and cluster
multipolarity is followed by war (see the
sixth column of Table V). Furthermore, in
the nineteenth century, an increase in alliance
multipolarity (from ti to t6) is positively
correlated (r = .31) with the subsequent
magnitude of war (the sum of nation-months
from t6 to t 11 ), indicating that prior to war
alliance clusters were disintegrating. In the
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Table Vi. Untested Explanation for Difference
between the Two Centuries
twentieth century, on the other hand, an
increase in alliance multipolarity (from to
to t6) is negatively correlated (r = -.48) with
the subsequent magnitude of war (the sum of
the nation-months from t6 to tll), indicating
that prior to wars the alliance patterns were
becoming more bipolarized. These differences
between centuries are similar to the ones
found by Singer & Small (1968) using several
alliance and (cluster) bipolarity measures, all
different from the ones used here.
Why are correlations from Table V signifi-
cant, and even in the wrong direction, in the
nineteenth century? One possibility that is
consistent with the theoretical structure of
this paper involves the total hostility in the
system. This hostility could rise to very high
levels in years of intense conflict between
groups of states. Especially in the nineteenth
century, during the balance of power era,
hostility and the subsequent threat of war
might induce nations to hedge their bets by
dropping out of blocs to maintain maximum
flexibility by cultivating many potential allies.
Meanwhile (see Table VI), the hostility could
also lead to war. Even if the alliance multi-
polarity were itself having a pacifying effect
on the system, the bivariate correlation
between multipolarity and war could yield an
insignificant result. If one could control for
hostility, the correlation might change enough
to confirm the third hypothesis.
The statistically significant correlation
supporting hypothesis three is the correlation
of first differences (r = -.56) for the
twentieth century. This correlation means that
a system that has become more alliance multi-
polar than in the previous time period will
experience significantly less war than in that
earlier time period. These first differences
measure velocities - the rate at which the
system is becoming more warlike, and the rate
at which it is becoming more cluster bipolar.
Technically, the correlation for the first
difference is also significant for the entire
1815 to 1965 period (as can be seen in the
second column of Table V). This finding con-
sidered alone would confirm proposition three
for both centuries. But the separate analyses
of each century indicate such disparate results
that such a conclusion would appear to be an
overgeneralization. The nineteenth and
twentieth centuries do seem substantially
different.
While this finding for the twentieth century
is consistent with the theoretical argument
and with hypothesis three, it appears to be
the opposite of the finding of Bueno de
Mesquita in his analysis of the same century. ’2
He computes the number of ’poles’ among all
system members (not just major powers), and
then computes the number of interaction
opportunities among poles. (The number of
such opportunities is found by multiplying
the number of poles times that number minus
one, and then dividing by two. When the
system is multipolar, there will be many
interaction opportunities.) He finds that the
amount of war in the subsequent five years
is positively correlated with the number of
interaction opportunities (a correlation of .32)
and with a shift towards more interaction
opportunities than had been available five
years before (a correlation of .52).
How can Bueno de Mesquita’s findings be
reconciled with the present findings? First,
he is focusing on the polarization of the
entire ’system’, while this paper focuses
only on the major power system. Second, and
related to the first point, his count of inter-
action opportunities swells as system size
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Table V11. Correlations between Selected Indicators of Cluster Polarization.a
a. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients based on measurements at five-year intervals, 1815-1965. Cor-
relations of .404 or greater are significant at the .05 level, and these have been indicated by italicizing. Variables
marked with an asterisk have been flipped in direction, as discussed in the text, to maximize the likelihood of
obtaining positive correlations. All data are from Correlates of War Project archives.
grows. For example, the present measure
indicates that the 1950s were the decade of
greatest alliance bipolarity since the Napo-
leonic Wars. His measure, which is affected
by the growth in the number of independent
nations, indicates that the 1950s were one
of the four decades with the greatest amount
of alliance multipolarity. Such disagreements
about a well-known decade illustrate how two
measures of alliance polarization might be
weakly correlated, uncorrelated, or even
negatively correlated with each other. Such
correlations do not invalidate either measure,
nor should the measures be attacked solely
by appeals to face validity. 13 1 have chosen
major powers as the focus of measurement,
however, because I remain unconvinced that
the clusters of minor powers would have much
causal effect on the war proneness of the
major power system. For example, in 1960,
Bueno de Mesquita reports a cluster made up
of Finland and Mongolia. The mere existence
of this cluster, in a world with ten other
clusters, increases the total interaction
opportunities by ten (from forty-five to
fifty-five), according to Bueno de Mesquita’s
formula. (In contrast, the average number of
interaction opportunities in the nineteenth
century is about one.) According to the Bueno
de Mesquita formula, the impact of the
Finland-Mongolia cluster is the same as the
impact of NATO. My own view of the inter-
national system, from 1815 to 1965, puts
much more emphasis on power stratification;
on the dominance of the core powers over
the rest of the nation-members of the system;
and on the tendency for major-major and even
major-minor interactions to dominate over
minor-minor interactions.’4 Therefore, I am
very skeptical of any alleged causal implica-
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tions that are based on assumptions that
major and minor powers can be treated
interchangeably and I have more confidence
in the possible causal importance of bivariate
correlations based on analyses of major-major
interactions, for the period from 1815 to
1965. Until such conflicting measurement
assumptions are reconciled, and until we can
control for all plausible rival hypotheses, we
will continue to encounter more or less
plausible, but conflicting, findings in the
literature.
The disagreement between this paper and
the Bueno de Mesquita indicators is not
unique; rather, each scholar who has at-
tempted to measure ’alliance polarization’
or ’cluster polarity’ has developed his own
idiosyncratic algorithm, and . no one has
documented the correlations betwen his
indicator and others that have gone before.
The resulting Tower of Babel is illustrated
by Table VII, in which eight published
indicators of cluster polarity (as stored in the
Correlates of War Project data archives)
are compared to each other and to the cluster
polarization indicator used in the current
paper. (In Table VII, the sign of three
indicators has been reversed in order to insure
that as may correlations as possible are
positive; this means that any negative cor-
relations will point to measures of cluster
polarization that have produced reversed
results.) A glance at the table shows that the
eight indicators by Singer and Small, Li and
Thompson, and Bueno de Mesquita clearly are
measuring (hopefully because of the different
intentions of the authors) fundamentally
different things. The patterns are most discon-
certing for the indicators based on all nation-
states. For example, the Singer and Small
alliance aggregation measure is correlated,
at the .01 level of statistical significance,
negatively with one Bueno de Mesquita
measure (number of poles) and positively
with another (tightness of poles). The measures
of polarization in the major power system
are more convergent with each other. The Li
and Thompson and Singer and Small measures
are all significantly correlated, in the positive
direction, to each other. The measure used
in the current paper is significantly associated,
in the positive direction, with all of these
prior measures of polarization of the major
power system except one of the Li and
Thompson measures, which falls barely short
of statistical significance. As a general rule,
the very weak associations are those between
the major power system indicators and the
indicators for all nation-states; the main
exception to that rule is the strong relation-
ship of the Li and Thompson measures to the
Singer-Small alliance aggregation measure.
While it is beyond the scope of the present
paper, in the future it would be appropriate
for literature reviews to consider these cor-
relations before reaching conclusions about
the meaning of the disparate findings that
have been reported. It appears that cluster
multipolarity is much more of a multi-
dimensional concept than power bipolarity,
and this point needs greater attention in
texts and literature reviews. Meantime, for
purposes of the present paper, it can be said
that the indicator used, while unrelated to
measures of cluster polarization for all nation-
states, is significantly correlated with the
bulk of the measures of major-power system
cluster polarization, and to that extent is
producing reliable results. Discrepancies with
studies, such as Bueno de Mesquita’s, which
focus on the war-proneness of the system
based on polarization patterns among all
nation-states, are not surprising.
To summarize my findings, with regard
to the two hypotheses tested in this paper,
significant correlations exist which support
the power polarity hypothesis in the whole
period from 1815 to 1965, and the spatial
polarization hypothesis in the twentieth
century. None of the correlations discovered
in this paper, however, is large enough to
account for over half the variance in the
amount of war. Thus even the highest
correlations in this study are not enough
to support a monocausal explanation of
warfare, and other variables besides system
polarization are clearly relevant. Indeed,
until these other potential causes are specified,
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measured, and included as control variables,
causal inferences about polarization and
warfare will remain only suggestive. As for
the theory of polarization that has been
presented, it cannot be proven by the con-
firmation of hypotheses derived from it. Other
theoretical formulations might generate the
same hypotheses. But the failure to discon-
firm does lend some greater plausibility to
the theory, and does raise serious questions
about the contrary assertions of Haas, Bueno
de Mesquita, and other authors discussed
above.
7. Conclusions
Theoretically, this paper has contended that
the Waltz thesis and the Deutsch and Singer
thesis, classically juxtaposed in the literature,
may both be valid. Waltz argues that bipolarity
is more stable than multipolarity. It has been
theorized in this paper that he is correct
insofar as he refers to power bipolarity,
which minimizes the magnitude of war, should
a war break out. Deutsch and Singer argue
that multipolarity is more stable. It has been
theorized in this paper that they are correct
insofar as they refer to cluster multipolarity,
which is less likely to lead to war than is
cluster bipolarity.
The correlational evidence analyzed above
is mildly supportive of both these hypotheses,
for the twentieth century. The power polarity
hypothesis seems confirmed for the whole
period from 1815 to 1965. The cluster, or
alignment, polarity hypothesis seems con-
firmed for the twentieth century. Significant
correlations support it for the whole 1815-
1965 period. But after separate bivariate
analysis of each century, it seems discon-
firmed for the nineteenth century, perhaps
because of the effects of hostility on the
balance of power alliance structures of that
era.
If the findings for the twentieth century
should prove valid, and the theory should be
upheld, it would follow that a combination
of power bipolarity and alignment multi-
polarity is the formula for stability in the
modern era. The implications of such a per-
spective for foreign policy making would
include the encouragement of political
diversity and multicentrism of alliance
patterns, along with a discouragement of
massive transfers and proliferations of
weapons technologies that might destabilize
the power bipolarity of the international
system of our nuclear age. Whatever the
empirical results may show, it is the heartening
conclusion of this essay that the relevant
arguments of Waltz and of Deutsch and Singer
were valid and consistent with each other.
Students of international politics who might
have concluded that the arguments were
contradictory could only have been dis-
couraged at the level of theoretical integra-
tion and agreement in this area of the litera-
ture. If the theoretical structure of the present
paper is sound, this potential area of disagree-
ment has been replaced by a consistent
theoretical structure based on a clearer under-
standing of the wisdom of both of these
earlier theories.
NOTES
1. The author would like to thank Don Anderson,
Mike Champion, Pat Dobel, Leo Hazlewood,
George Liska, Cliff Morgan, Miko Nincic, Al
Sabrosky, David Singer, and the anonymous
reviewers from JPR for their comments on this
paper. Special thanks are due to J. David Singer
for his recommendations concerning the paper,
and also for the highly collegial and cooperative
atmosphere that he maintains at the Correlates
of War Project. Finally, thanks are due to Mike
Champion, Cliff Morgan, and Judy Nowack for
helping the author in gaining efficient access to
the data that are analyzed in this paper.
2. The splitting of ’polarization’ into two different
dimensions, as is done here, is fundamentally
different from the approach of Richard Rosecrance
in his discussion of ’Bi-multipolarity’. He treats
this concept as an ’intermediate’ level of a uni-
dimensional continuum from bipolarity to multi-
polarity. As such, his concept mixes a discussion
of power concentration with a discussion of coalition
clustering without distinguishing the two. It thereby
carries forward the ambiguities inherent in the
Deutsch, Singer, and Waltz debate. See Rosecrance
(1966).
3. Coalition configuration and power concentration
have been presented as dichotomous variables to
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simplify discussion in the historical examples and
definitions above; they will be treated as con-
tinuous variables in the measurement section of
the paper.
4. In this it differs from alliance analyses that include
all members of the international system. These
analyses include Bueno de Mesquita (1975), and
Wallace (1973).
5. The data base, from the Correlates of War
Project, is an updated version of that reported
in Singer, Bremer & Stuckey (1972).
6. Singer & Small (1968). Trade has also been
proposed as an indicator of ’bipolarization’, or
cluster polarity. See Goldman (1974) and Wall
( 1972). Goldman and Wall demonstrate the relev-
ance of trade, aid, and related data to measures
of post-World War 11 polarization patterns. Trade
data, however, do not exist, even for all the major
powers, back to 1816, so statistical analyses of
trade and international conflict have been limited
to the twentieth century. Extensive C.O.W. analyses
of trade volume and trade dependency have failed
to detect any relationship between trade and
militarized disputes or war, 1950-1976. These
studies were path breaking in that they examined
not only trade volume, but also the marginal
utilities for imports and exports of each side
(using price elasticities of supply and demand).
See Huelshof & Soltvedt (1981). Their study was
discouraging because of the persistent absence
of statistically significant relationships between
trade and disputes or war. Given this experience,
given the already monumental task of treating
power concentration and alliance polarization,
and given the dearth of trade data over the 1815-
1965 period, trade was not included in the present
study.
7. Within a specific historic period, cluster polarity
and power polarity may be more highly correlated.
Such a correlation is suggested by the findings of
Rapkin, Thompson & Christopherson (1979). Their
study of the 1948-1973 era, published as the bulk
of the present research was being completed, is
based on COPDAB event data. While Rapkin,
Thompson, and Christopherson arrive at their
findings with radically different operationalizations,
there are clear parallels between their concept of
’polarity’ and the concept of ’power polarity’ in
the present study, as well as between their concept
of ’polarization’ and the concept of ’cluster
polarity’ in the present study.
8. Snyder & Diesing (1977), pp. 420-421. This type
of alliance configuration in similar to what Rapkin,
Thompson & Christopherson (1979) have called
bipolarization.
9. See Bueno de Mesquita & Singer (1973), pp.
237-273, and especially p. 264, for a discussion
of the role of ideology and other factors in alliance
formation, and the need for more empirical
research on the subject. For a thoughtful review
of the state of the art, see Ward (1982).
10. Indeed, as already indicated by Bueno de Mes-
quita’s work on tightness and discreteness, alliance
polarization may very well itself be a multidimen-
sional concept, as may power concentration (which
involves both the number of major powers and the
distribution of power among them).
11. On the more positive side, the correlation between
two measures of power concentration &mdash; CON and
TWOCON &mdash; has been reported above, at page 68,
and the correlations between a sample of cluster
polarization measures are reported below, at page
74.
12. Bueno de Mesquita (1975, p. 206). Bueno de
Mesquita focuses on wars involving at least one
major power, and the present study has also
focused on the set of major-major and major-minor
wars. The measure of alliance multipolarity in the
present paper does not exactly correspond to his
measures of interaction opportunities, number of
clusters, tightness, and discreteness, of course.
13. See Lee Cronbach (1970, pp. 121-124) for a
discussion of construct validation and an introduc-
tion to the literature on validation.
14. While this view originated with conservative
realists, it is shared by many radicals as well.
See Daniel Chirot (1977) for a summary of this
perspective on the world system.
Ostrom & Aldrich (1978) have modified the
Bueno de Mesquita data in a manner somewhat
consistent with this view. They calculated the
number of independent clusters that included
at least one major power. They then added the
number of non-aligned major powers to the initial
total. The resulting grand total is the sum of all
the major-major and major-minor clusters and the
number of non-aligned major powers. This measure
will probably still be sensitive, as the underlying
Bueno de Mesquita index is, to the sheer growth
in the number of minor powers during the twentieth
century.
Ostrom and Aldrich take the surprising but
useful approach of reducing most of the literature
on polarity to a set of hypotheses about the number
of independent actors. While their approach
produces interesting and fruitful results, it is limited
by this choice they have made about how to inter-
pret the theoretical literature. Leaving aside attempts
to incorporate crosscutting cleavages, intermediary
roles, divided attention, discreteness and tightness,
they find support for George Liska’s conclusion
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